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ABSTRACT 
Market discipline has emerged as a complementary tool for banking supervision. Its 
effectiveness depends on bank disclosure policy and on market participant’s ability to 
monitor bank riskiness and impose discipline. We develop a game theoretic model 
where the bank sends a signal about its riskiness to market participants (the 
stakeholders) and they, in turn, evaluate the credibility of the signal and make 
inferences about bank soundness. The model takes into account both bank disclosure 
policy and market participant reaction to disclosure. The outcome of the model 
indicates that market participants have the ability to monitor risk but lack the ability to 
impose actions that reflect this assessment. The theoretical conclusion of the model is 
empirically tested against data from Greek banking sector. A transparency index is 
developed based on publicly available data and undisclosed supervisory data but the 
results are contradictory and do not always confirm the theoretical predictions.  
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1.  Introduction 
For a long period of time banking supervision was driven by regulation 
discipline, where the regulatory authorities set the rules and banks were obliged to 
obey. During the ’90s it was made clear that an alternative mechanism for supervision 
was necessary. Market discipline has, subsequently, emerged as the major 
complementary tool for supervision since it is considered a mechanism that can limit 
excess risk-taking. Market discipline refers to the measures taken by the market 
participants for banks that do not exhibit the appropriate risk-taking behaviour. It 
depends on bank disclosure policy as well as market participants incentives to 
undertake the necessary actions. This paper develops a model that takes into account 
both aspects. 
The motivation for this paper stems from the third pillar of the New Capital 
Adequacy Framework which is entirely devoted to market discipline and outlines a set 
of disclosure recommendations which are expected to enhance transparency and allow 
market participants to assess key information for banks’ financial position. Pillar III 
seems to focus on the availability of information and little concern has been shown 
whether the interested parties gather, process and interpret information in a consistent 
and appropriate manner. The conception underlying this focus is that with 
information, like any other normal homogeneous good, more is always better than 
less. More available information automatically translates into greater transparency and 
no potential frictions in the process of transmitting information are taken into account. 
However, market discipline depends on the ability of the market to accurately assess 
the condition of the bank and on the ability to impose managerial reactions that reflect 
those assessments. Thus, the model incorporates bank disclosure policy as well as the 
ability of market participants to monitor bank riskiness and influence bank actions. 
The paper is divided into four sections. The first section analyses the concept of 
market discipline and its components, the bank’s disclosure policy, the ability of the 
market to accurately assess the condition of the bank and the ability to impose 
managerial reactions. The second section develops a game theoretic model that 
incorporates all components of market discipline. The model indicates that market 
participants have the ability to monitor the risk but lack the ability to impose bigger 
transparency to riskier banks and specifies the hypotheses for testing these results. In 
the third section empirical investigation of the hypotheses is undertaken with   6
reference to Greek banking sector. The results are contradictory and are not consistent 
with all the predictions of the theoretical model.  
 
2.  The concept of market discipline 
Market discipline refers to a market-based incentive mechanism where market 
participants “punish” a bank that does not exhibit the appropriate risk-taking 
behaviour. The “punishment” may manifest itself in three forms, the price effect, 
where investors require higher returns on bank securities, the quantity effect, where 
depositors withdraw their funds and the valuation effect, where stock market 
participants drive down the bank value. However, whether “punishment” occurs in 
practice depends on market participants’ incentives. They have to have some funds at 
risk so that the possibility of loss provides them with the incentive to monitor and 
evaluate the bank risk. The effectiveness of market discipline depends on three 
aspects, the bank’s disclosure policy, the ability of the market participants to assess 
bank’s riskiness (ability to monitor) and the ability to impose discipline (ability to 
influence). 
2.1 Bank disclosure policy  
The regulatory framework requires some minimum disclosure of bank activities 
(mandatory disclosure) but often banks undertake the initiative of disclosing 
additional elements (voluntary disclosure). The mandatory disclosure is a regulation 
compliance issue whereas the voluntary disclosure is a corporate governance issue. 
The voluntary disclosure problem of the bank can be analysed as follows. Assume 
that λ is the required market return. If θ1 is the necessary information set in order to 
judge the bank riskiness, then λ1 is the required return on bank assets with  () 1 1 θ λ f =  
and  λ λ > 1 .  This separates the (λ,θ) space into two sub-spaces where investment 
decisions can be made (Figure 1a). If market participants receive a noisy information 
set θ2, subset of θ1, then there exist a  ( ) 1 2 2 λ θ λ > = f  as investment criterion. The 
combination of the two cases creates two new sub-spaces (Figure 1b). In area A Type 
I error exists, because the bank did not manage to attract investment, although sound, 
while in area B  Type II error exists, because the bank managed to attract investment,   7
although unsound. The disclosure policy objective of the bank is to minimise the Type 
I error by sending the appropriate message to the market.   
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The subject of information disclosure stirred the interest of researchers after the 
publication of Crowford and Sobel’s (1982) paper, where the existence of complete or 
partial disclosure equilibrium is analysed. Recent surveys of the literature (Healy and 
Palepu 2001, Verrecchia 2001) provide evidence that the optimal disclosure policy is 
the partial disclosure equilibrium. In the absence of a proper market-based incentives 
mechanism, a bank may take the initiative to introduce noise into the disclosure and 
undertake a parallel effort to persuade the market participants (persuasion game). The 
regulatory authorities can alleviate the problem by introducing enhanced disclosure 
regulation. There is little doubt that an enhanced disclosure regime can mitigate the 
effects of a banking crisis (Hyytinen and Takalo 2004) and reduce the volatility of 
bank stocks (Baumann and Nier 2004). However, not all forms of disclosure 
regulation lead to the socially optimal equilibrium. There are situations where the 
benefits of increased transparency are detrimental. Several studies (Cordella and 
Yeyati 1998, Blum 2002 and Matutes and Vives 2000) show that, in cases where bank 
risk is exogenous and beyond the control of the bank, enhanced disclosure can lead to 
reduction of the bank’s value. Hyytinen and Takalo (2002), who introduce in their 
model elements of disclosure cost and deposit guarantee schemes, draw similar 
conclusions. When the bank cannot exploit the economies of scope in the monitoring 
of its investments and the coverage of the deposit guarantee is wide, increased 
transparency leads to a higher probability of bankruptcy. 
   8
2.2 The ability to monitor 
The ability to monitor refers to the ability of the market participants to assess 
the financial condition of the bank from available public information. It is often 
argued that banks are inherently opaque institutions for an outsider to judge, the main 
reason being their loan portfolio. Loans are privately negotiated contracts where some 
form of discretion is inevitable, which results in a lack of transparency and liquidity. 
Further, the volatility of the trading portfolio introduces additional ambiguity into the 
assessment of the bank’s financial condition. Mark to market valuations tend to be 
rather unpredictable and changes may underpin the financial position over-day. This 
further raises the question of risk management techniques. The development of 
internal models for risk measurement and the disclosure of the results is clear progress 
(Jorion 2002), but one should be cautious because these techniques involve 
complicated mathematical models that vary from bank to bank and any peer 
comparison is by no means clear-cut. 
There are some empirical papers that take up the issue of the ability of outsiders 
to monitor and interpret the information in a consistent and appropriate manner.  The 
conclusion of a paper by Jordan, Peek and Rosengren (2000) is that  “…for a country 
(USA) that is a leader in advocating enhanced transparency for banks and where 
banks have long been required to provide substantial detail on non-performing loans, 
loan loss reserves, capital ratios, and on- and off-balance sheet positions, it is 
surprising that formal (supervisory) action announcements would be viewed as being 
so informative that market participants would reduce the value of a bank as much as 
20%”. They find that supervisory information releases provide significant new 
information to financial markets, resulting in a 5% decline in stock prices, on average. 
Morgan (2002) examines split ratings, that is, differences in ratings by rating 
agencies, and concludes that the likelihood of a split rating is greater in cases of banks 
in relation to other sectors and increases as the proportion of loans in bank assets 
increases.  
2.3 The ability to influence 
Even if markets can identify a bank’s real financial condition, it is not obvious 
that the action taken and the signals sent can influence the actions of the bank’s 
management. This is mainly attributed, in the literature, to the heterogeneity of agents   9
with respect to their individual requirements for information. One can identify at least 
four groups of market participants interested in the bank’s financial condition, 
depositors, bondholders, stockholders and supervisors. 
The depositors, to the degree that their deposits are protected by deposit 
insurance schemes, have no incentive to take any action since there are no funds at 
risk. Usually they do not have the expertise and cannot afford the cost of monitoring. 
Their actions are mainly driven by liquidity needs. Bondholders may have more 
incentives but these are somehow diluted by implicit protection schemes such as 
liquidity facilities, minimum capital requirements, etc. In addition, bondholders are 
less interested in the upside potential of the bank and more concerned about downside 
risk. They mainly focus on default avoidance and they try to influence the bank’s 
actions in that direction. A particular class of bondholders, the subordinated 
bondholders, may have more incentives if the instruments are actively traded in the 
market. There is a voluminous literature that advocates the mandatory use of 
subordinated debt to improve market discipline (Herring 2004) and empirical 
evidence on its effectiveness (Sironi 2003, B.I.S 2003). As far as stockholders are 
concerned, their perspective is different from that of depositors or bondholders. 
Stockholders may have a moral hazard opportunity to opt for riskier investments as 
long as they are compensated for the additional risk. Under such circumstances they 
may increase the value of their claims by increasing bank riskiness, thus rendering 
them unlikely candidates to impose discipline. Finally, the supervisors require 
information in order to ensure stability and deposit protection. They focus on 
bankruptcy issues so their information needs are more aligned with bondholders.  
The heterogeneity of agents requiring information may force the bank to regard 
information as a differentiated good that can be tailored to the specific needs of each 
group. This poses further risks. If the receivers can communicate they will be 
confronted with multiple messages that may increase confusion. In addition, 
channelling private information to different groups creates additional informational 
asymmetries. 
Empirical evidence on the ability of market participants to influence bank 
management action is focused on whether the risk premium on different debt 
instruments is strong enough to discipline banks. Morgan and Stiroh (2001), Gropp et 
al (2002) find that the bond market prices banks efficiently so it can exercise   10
influence. In contrast, Bliss and Flannery (2001) conclude that bond and stock market 
signals are not strong enough to significantly affect managerial behaviour. Similar 
conclusions are drawn by Kwan (2004). Other studies focus on depositors’ ability to 
influence bank actions. Caprio and Honohan (2004) conclude that even 
unsophisticated markets can provide discipline but Wilson, Rose and Pinfold (2004), 
focusing on New Zealand market, fail to find evidence for this. 
  
3.  Signaling game between the bank and the market 
The bank’s disclosure policy can be analyzed as a game of strategic interaction 
between the bank and the market. It is a signaling game since it includes the 
interaction of a sender and a receiver. In every signaling game there are three 
parameters, the type of sender  ( ) ν t t t tn ... , 2 1 ∈ , the type of message  () λ m m m ml ... , 2 1 ∈ , 
the reaction of the receiver  ( ) κ a a a ak ... , 2 1 ∈ , as well as the payoff functions of the 
sender  () k l n
S a m t U , ,  and the receiver  ( ) k l n
R a m t U , , . The objective of the game is 
the estimation of parameters  ( ) k l n a m t , ,  that maximise the payoff functions. A 
signaling game results in Nash equilibrium, which is determined by backward-
induction and should satisfy three conditions (Gibbons 1992): 
1. After the transmission of the message  ) ( l m , the receiver observes the message and 
forms a belief about the type of sender  ) ... / ( 1 ν t t t p n with a probability distribution 
) / ( l n m t h  
2. For each message  ) ( l m , the reaction of the receiver  ) (
*
l m a  should maximize his 
expected payoff function given his belief. Consequently,  ) (
*
l m a is the result of   
∑ ) , , ( ) / ( max k l n
R
l n a m t U m t h  
3. For each message  ) (
*
n t m the sender should maximize his expected payoff function 
given the strategy of the receiver  ) (
*
l m a . Consequently,  ) (
*
n t m  results from 
)) ( , , ( max
*
l l n
S m a m t U . 
The market usually does not accept the message as such, but rather proceeds to 
decide on its credibility. Usually the credibility of the message is connected with the 
type of sender  () ν t t t tn ... , 2 1 ∈ . The receiver observes the type of sender, determines   11
the reliability of the message and decides on his strategy, which leads to a Nash 
equilibrium (Gibbons 1992). From the evaluation of the message the receiver revises 
his belief regarding the type of sender and the probability distribution  ) / ( l n m t h  
according to Bayes rule as  ∑ = ) ... / ( / ) .. / ( ) / ( 1 1
*
ν ν t t t p t t t p m t h n n l n . If the receiver 
concludes that there is no new reliable information
1, then his reaction results from:  
   ∑ ) , , ( ) / ( max k l n
R
l n a m t U m t h   
whereas if he concludes that there is new reliable information then his reaction results 
from: 




l i a m t U m t h   
3.1 The framework of the signaling game  
In order to model the components of market discipline, we consider a dynamic 
Bayesian game with incomplete information. The game is dynamic because the 
participants’ actions are successive and at each stage each participant knows all the 
background information of the game. It is also an incomplete information game 
because each participant is uncertain about the payoff function of the other side. 
Finally, it is a Bayesian game because the beliefs are revised according to Bayes rules. 
The game is developed in three stages. 
First stage (st1): the bank draws funds in the form of deposits and undertakes N 
uniform and independent investment initiatives with initial probability of success 
prior q . The bank is valued according to this probability. 
Second stage (st2): with the arrival of new information the bank revises the 
probability of success  post q  and determines the number of investment initiatives that 
are expected to succeed. At the same time, it makes a decision about the disclosure 
policy. The market, in turn, activates a credibility control mechanism and revises its 
risk assessment of the bank. 
Third stage (st3): the uncertainty is resolved and market participants have complete 
information about the outcome of investments and value the bank accordingly.  
                                                           
1 If the game is one period game, the sender cannot built a truth-telling reputation.    12
More analytically, 
First stage (st1) : In the first stage  the bank draws deposit funds D with constant cost 
r (perfect competition) and place them  in N uniform and independent investment 
initiatives. We consider that the drawn funds and the placements made are of the same 
maturity, so the sole risk that the bank faces comes from the quality of investment 
initiatives (credit risk).  The objective of the bank is the maximisation of investments 
return and hence the maximisation of its value. Therefore, we can consider a 
monotonic transformation of the payoff function 
() () [ ] k l n
S
prior k l n
S
prior a m t U F a m t V , , , , =  
where  =
S
prior V a priori value of bank according to the estimation of the bank itself.  
The transformed function (the valuation) conveys the same information set as the 
initial function (payoff function) and by assuming  0 > ′ F , it is ensured that the 
S
prior V and 
S
prior U always move in the same direction. 
The market participants also have an initial opinion about the outcome of the N 
investment initiatives and value the bank accordingly. This suggests another 
monotonic transformation of the payoff function as: 
() () [ ] k l n
R
prior k l n
R
prior a m t U G a m t V , , , , =  
where  =
R
prior V  the a priori value of bank according to the market, 
with  0 > ′ G , to  ensure that  
R
prior V and 
R
prior U   always move to the same direction. In 




prior V V = . 
Further, each of the N investment initiatives has a real return  N i Ri ... 1    , = , which 
depends on two factors, the prior probability of success  prior q , and an external shock S 
that influences all  investment initiatives but in different ways. Consequently:  
) , ( i prior i S q f R =  with  0 /     , 0 /     , 0 /
2 2 > ∂ ∂ < ∂ ∂ > ∂ ∂ i i prior i prior i S R q R q R . 
Since the effect of shock S cannot be accurately forecasted, the return  i R  is unknown 
but it is assumed that it is drawn from a known distribution, the uniform distribution   13
over the interval [] γ γ 2 / 1 , 2 / 1 + − R R  where  [ ] R 2 , 0 ∈ γ
2. The valuation of the 
investment initiatives will be based on the expected value of each investment, that is, 
()R R E i = , using the binomial model (Shin 2003). Each successful investment, with 
probability  q , represents a "rise" in the binomial tree of value, while a failed 
investment, with probability q − 1 , a "decline". In the case of k successes the final 
value of investments is  ( )
k
final R IV + = 1 . In any interim period, the value of 
investments is the expected value of  final IV , that is,  ) ( int final erim IV E IV = .  erim IVint  can 
be approximated from the cumulative binomial distribution as  



















which simplifies to  ()
N
erim qR IV + = 1 int  





prior R q IV + = 1 
Second stage (st2) : In the second stage  the arrival of new information results in 
agents revising the initial probability of success. The revised probability depends on 
the uncertain external shock S and as a result it cannot be estimated with certainty. 
The effects of the external shock can be controlled with the implementation of a 
monitoring process. The monitoring technology can be described with a Cobb-
Douglas type function: 
d c
prior post M q q =    
where the posterior probability of success  [ ] 1 , 0 ∈ post q  is a function of prior 
probability of success  prior q  and the ability to monitor the investment initiatives 
[] 1 , 0 ∈ M . The coefficients () [ ] 1 , 0 , ∈ d c  indicate elasticity of initial probability and 
monitoring effort. We consider that  1 ≠ + d c , since otherwise the equation is 
homogenous of first degree, meaning that if the initial probability or the monitoring 
effort doubles, the final probability of success doubles, which does not correspond to 
                                                           
2 The upper limit on risk exists so as to ensure positive expected returns and to take into account the 
restrictions that the bank faces. 
   14
reality. Consequently, the final probability of success is proportional to the initial 
probability of success. The bank cannot significantly affect the final probability of 
success unless the initial probability is satisfactory. This deficiency is partially 
covered by the monitoring effort M, the size of which will determine the revised 
probability of success.  















∂ − d c
prior
post M q d d
M
q
 since  1 0 ≤ ≤ d  
The marginal effect of monitoring effort on the probability of success is positive and 
bigger for investments with a better initial probability of success. Further, the 
monitoring effort includes cost. The cost of monitoring can be determined as: 
  M
m
M C × =
2
) ( 
with m>0 the cost per "unit of" monitoring. 
The optimal amount of monitoring  M* can estimated endogenously from the 





D R qpost − − = ρ π    
where R = the expected return of investments,  
           r = cost of capital,  





D R M q
d c
prior − − = ⇒ ρ π    
The first order condition is: 
()0
2
1 = − − =
∂
∂ − m



















) 1 ( ) (
2
ρ
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Given the initial quality of investment  prior q , the monitoring effort M* is an 
increasing function of the expected return, R, but a declining function of the deposit 
funds, D. The new value of the probability of success is given by: 
) 1 (


















    






post R q IV + = 1 
In third stage (st3) : In the third stage any uncertainty is resolved and market 
participants have complete information  to value the bank. The final outcome Ri of 




final V V = . 
3.2 Transparency of bank disclosure and the reaction of the market 
As analysed above, the parameters of the signaling game () K l a m ,
3 can be 
extracted endogenously from the maximisation of bank value. In the first and last 
stage of the game there is symmetric information, therefore the analysis focuses on 
the intermediary stage, where the disclosure policy and the reaction of the market 
participants are determined. 
Assume that in the intermediary period, st2, the bank forms the following 
views: 
K = investment initiatives that are expected be successful 
L = investment initiatives with ambiguous final outcome 
where K + L = N  
The bank can apply two alternative policies, the policy of complete disclosure, where 
the actual vector ( ) post q L K , ,  is disclosed, and the policy of partial disclosure, where 
                                                           
3 The parameter for the type of the bank  ( ) ν t t t tn ... , 2 1 ∈ is not used since it is assumed that the market 
initially cannot determine whether a bank is “good” or “bad” in relation to transparency.   16
the vector( )
* , , post q bL aK  is disclosed. If the bank chooses to disclose





post V V = , since there is no diverging beliefs between bank and market. If the 
bank introduces noise and discloses ( )




post V V ≠  since 
( ) ( )
* , , , , post post q bL aK q L K ≠  and ( ) 1 , ≠ b a  
According to the above approach, the information vector is three-dimensional 
and the bank should decide into which element to introduce noise. It is more effective 
to disclose the probability of success and introduce noise into the number of 
successful investment initiatives. The available vector of information is () L K, and it 
decides to disclose () bL aK,  where  ω ≤ ≤ a 1
5 and  1 0 ≤ ≤ b . The parameters () b a,  
reflect the degree of transparency since they determine the degree of noise in the 
message. If  1 = a  and  1 = b  the message does not contain any noise while if  1 ≠ a  
and  1 ≠ b the message contains a certain degree of noise
6. The introduction of noise 
should not be understood as fraud. It is rather aiming at gaining sufficient time for 
corrective actions and moderating the internal and external pressure. The disclosure of 
all available information is likely to limit bank choices since public disclosure is not a 
free good, especially if it works. 
The bank, when deciding appropriate disclosure, faces certain restrictions. 
Firstly, the restriction of revelation, that is, the possibility that the market determines 
whether the disclosure was false or true in a later stage. Moreover, the bank itself 
faces an uncertainty with respect to the final outcome of its investments. Even for 
failed investments it faces the dilemma whether to declare them impaired or to renew 
the financing. 
Another factor that affects the degree of noise is the intensity of the agency 
problem in the bank. If the bank is “management controlled” and the compensation of 
                                                           
4 The bank could choose no disclosure. In our study this case will be ignored. We consider the case 
where the information that is disclosed by the bank is essential for its valuation and not just cheap talk. 
Therefore the message is part of the market participant’s payoff function. 
5 We assume that the market knows the total number N of investment initiatives and consequently 
1 ≥ a . In addition, we place an upper limit ω  on the coefficient value since it should be the case that 
K N a / ≤ . We also consider that the value of a  should not be very high since then disclosure would 
touch the limits of fraud. This restriction will be useful later. 
6 We differ from the definitions of Boot and Schmeits (2000) and Hyytinen and Takalo (2002) who 
define transparency as the probability that market participants (the depositors in their models) 
determine the monitoring ability of the bank.   17
the managers is related to the performance disclosed, then the degree of noise is likely 
to be important. In addition, the degree of noise depends on the possibility of free 
riding on internal information. Banks, being information intensive organisations, 
gather and process considerable amounts of information, which is at the disposal of 
managers without cost. Efforts to exploit internal information would involve 
introducing noise into the message. 
Finally, the bank faces the restriction of regulation. The bank has as incentive to 
maximise  a ,  ) max(a , and minimise b, ) min(b . If transparency regulations exist, the 
bank may not have absolute discretion over its disclosure. It is likely that a subset 
() bL aK,  may not be compatible with the rules and the supervisory authority requires 
from the bank an alternative disclosure. In our model we consider that the bank 
incorporates all the above restrictions in its decision to disclose ( ) b a, . 
The model concludes with the specification of the market’s reaction, that is, its 
control over the credibility of the message. Control over credibility can take two 
forms: 
- Redefinition of () b a,  at the time of disclosure 
- Estimation of the final () b a,  based on the disclosure. 
In the first approach the valuation of the bank is short-term and myopic. By contrast, 
the second approach is more dynamic and takes the bank’s final value into 
consideration. Since the market knows the total number of investment initiatives N, it 
is enough to focus on only one parameter, the parameter ( ) a  and imply the parameter 
() b . Consequently the control over credibility takes the form of the determination of a 
new parameter: 
η + = ′ ′ a a .  
The parameter () η  introduces a stochastic element into the reaction of the market
7 and 
leads to the estimation of the probability  ) / ( aK K a p ′ ′  where: 
 aK  = the number of success the bank discloses  
                                                           
7 If  0    and    0 ) ( = = η σ η E , then the private information of the market does not modify the disclosure 
policy of the bank.    18
K a′ ′ = the final number of successful investment initiatives  
) / ( aK K a p ′ ′  shows the probability that the final number of successful investment is 
K a′ ′ based on the disclosed aK . The final value of the investments according to the 
market is: 
K aK K a R
final R R p R p IV
η ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( + + = + =
′ ′  
In any interim period the market determines the value of the investments 
R
erim IVint  as the expected value of 
R
final IV  based on aK  successful investment initiatives 
and the cumulative binomial distribution with ( ) K η  probable successful initiatives 
with joint probability ( ) p qpost ×  and ( ) K N η −  failed investment initiatives with joint 
probability ( ) p qpost × − 1.   































erim pR q R IV + + = ⇒ 1 1 int   
8 
3.3 Comparative static analysis and hypothesis testing 
The above analysis has specified two parameters,   ) / ( aK K a p ′ ′  which can be 
seen as the perceived probability of no-default and ( ) a  which reflects the disclosure 
policy of the bank. In equilibrium there is an interaction between the market () p and 
the bank () a , which is reflected in the maximisation of bank value. The value of the 
bank  ( ) post V  is defined as the present value of all future cash flows () t + π  under the 
condition of no bankruptcy up to ( ) t + . Consequently, the maximisation problem can 
be written: 
[ ] ... max 2 1
3
1
2 + + + = + + + π δ π δ δπ pp p Vpost  
t t s t ∀ > +    0     . π  
where  [] 1 , 0 ∈ δ  is the discount factor of future cash flows.   19
From the first order conditions we can determine the parameters () p  and () a  as 
functions of the bank’s riskiness ( ) post q . 


































D R p − − = ρ π  
and based on the estimation 
R







D pR q R
N
post
aK − − + + = ρ π  
() ()
1 1 1















aK + + + =
∂
∂




() () 0 1 1






post V pR q R R Nq F  
() () () 0 1 ln 1 1 =
∂
∂






R pR q R K G  
The above equations determine the equilibrium level of transparency and the 
probability of success of the investment initiatives according to the market. Then our 
fundamental objective is to isolate the effect of the two parameters on the bank’s 
riskiness, which is inversely related to the probability of success  post q .  
                                                                                                                                                                      
8 The equation holds for  a a ≥ ′ ′ , that is,  0 ≥ η . This is possible if the restriction on the coefficient a  
is valid and it does not take very high values so as the noise does not reach the limits of fraud (see 
footnote 7).   20
The first order conditions allow us to perform comparative statics analysis and 














































































These can be solved for the two partial derivatives according to Cramer’s rule and 




(Hypothesis 1). This states that the market estimation of probability of 
success  () p  and the actual probability of success ( ) post q  are positively correlated. 
Therefore, we can reach the conclusion that the market has the ability to evaluate the 
bank riskiness, that is, it has the ability to monitor. 
We can also derive the derivative  0 <
post dq
da
 (Hypothesis 2), which states that the 
actual probability of success ( ) post q  and the noisiness of the bank’s chosen disclosure 
policy
9  () a  are negatively correlated. Riskier banks choose a less transparent 
disclosure policy and the market cannot change that by forcing them to be more 
transparent. Therefore market participants cannot impose discipline on the banks’ 
decisions, at least on its transparency decisions. 
 
4.  Empirical investigation 
For empirically testing the specified hypotheses, we need three types of 
information: 
  the risk assessment according to financial data 
  the risk assessment according to the market and 
  a transparency index. 
                                                           
9 Recall that  ω ≤ ≤ a 1  and  1 → a  means that greater transparency, whereas  ω → a  means lower 
transparency.   21
A positive relation between the risk assessment according to the market and the 
risk assessment according to financial data indicates that the assessment of the market 
is correct and thus the market participants have the ability to assess the bank riskiness. 
As a consequence they have the ability to monitor the bank financial condition and 
thus hypothesis 1 is satisfied. A negative relation between the risk assessment 
according to financial data, or the risk assessment according to the market if 
hypothesis 1 is valid, and the transparency index indicates that riskier banks are less 
transparent and thus market participants do not have the ability to impose greater 
transparency on them. Generalising, we can assume that they do not have the ability 
to influence the bank actions. We test the two hypotheses using data from Greek 
banking sector.  
4.1 Risk assessment according to financial data 
Our sample consists of 9 commercial banks listed on Athens Stock Exchange 
(ASE)
10 and the sample data runs from 1993 to 2004
11. The risk assessment according 
to financial data is based on the CAMELS system. Bognini et al (2002) assess that 
CAMELS ratings exhibit the best predictive power, after bond risk premiums
12.   
For the evaluation of each CAMELS component we use a variety of ratios and 
each financial ratio  i X  is transformed to score  i B  as  [ ] i i X prob B = , ) 1 , 0 ( N X i → . 
This probability is considered to be the final score for each ratio. The total score of 












with  j = C, A, M, E, L, S and  n = the number of ratios in each risk component  
Then the aggregate CAMELS score (SCORE) is calculated as a weighted average: 







i w  
                                                           
10 We exclude banks with few data due to recent listing. 
11 The sample period begins from 1993, first year of the application of Greek Banking Accounting 
Standards and ends in 2004 the final year of these standards application, since afterwards IFRS are 
adopted. 
12 For the Greek banks there is no adequate number of active bond issues in order to estimate the risk 
premiums.    22
The weights are set to 10 . 0 , 15 . 0 , 2 . 0 , 15 . 0 , 2 . 0 , 2 . 0 6 5 4 3 2 1 = = = = = = w w w w w w   
following a judgment on the significance of each component. In addition, the total 
score is normalised on the size of the bank to reflect “too big to fail” policy, as: 
[] ) log(assets prob size = , [] ) 1 , 0 ( ) log( N assets →  
Based on the above methodology we calculate two aggregated CAMELS scores, 
the actual risk assessment (SCORE1) and the disclosed risk assessment (SCORE2). 
The actual risk assessment (SCORE1) is calculated from prudential reports the banks 
submit to the Bank of Greece (see Appendix 1). These reports are confidential and, 
presumably, are not disclosed to market participants
13. We assume that the data in 
these reports contain superior information for evaluating the soundness of a bank. 
This is confirmed by Berger et al (2000) for the US market and thus we consider the 
(SCORE1) as the actual bank risk. 
Further, we calculate the disclosed risk assessment (SCORE2) based solely on 
the public information set of the market participants, that is, the disclosed 
information. Thus we construct a second CAMELS score based on financial ratios 
calculated from published financial statements (see Appendix 2). 
4.2 Risk assessment according to the market 
The market participants possess public and private information. In order to 
capture both we use the beta coefficients as risk indicators, instead of (SCORE2). A 
simple market model, with daily data, is applied for each year in the sample period in 
order to calculate the beta coefficients for each listed commercial bank. Thus we 
compute 12 coefficients for each bank, that is, 12 x 9 = 108 coefficients.  
4.3 Transparency index 
In order to estimate a transparency index we apply an innovative approach 
based on the CAMELS risk assessments. We define the Transparency Index (BTI) as 
() ( ) 2 1 SCORE SCORE BTI − =  
                                                           
13 Contrary to this assumption, DeYoung et al (2001) show that the information contained in prudential 
reports is transferred to the market within short period of time and, particularly, “good” news is 
incorporated quickly whereas ”bad” news with a time lag.   23
The idea is that if the disclosed risk assessment is similar to actual risk assessment, 
then the market participants can infer the riskiness from public disclosure and the 
difference between the two scores is small. Therefore, the difference between the two 
scores can serve as a good approximation for transparency, with a smaller number 
indicating more transparency. 
In order for the above index to be robust, we must ensure that there is no 
transfer of information from confidential regulatory reports to the market participants. 
We run a test for detecting the validity of this constraint. The following regression is 
estimated for each bank 
() () 9 ... 1     1 1 1 2 = ∀ + + = i u SCORE a SCORE i i i γ    
The residuals of the system represent the residual information set. If the two sets of 
information explain each other then the residuals are expected to exhibit no 
autocorrelation. If autocorrelation exists then there is no transmission of the 
regulatory information set to the market. The results are shown in Table 1 (see 
Appendix 3). Based on the Durbin-Watson statistic (DW), there is substantial 
autocorrelation in all equations, which provides support for our assumption of no 
transmission. 
4.4 Hypothesis about the ability to monitor 
From the theoretical model of transparency and the analysis of comparative 
statics the relationship between market risk assessment and actual risk assessment is 
positive, meaning that the market can effectively evaluate bank risk from public 
disclosure. In order to test the empirical validity of the hypothesis we run the 
following panel data regression 
it it i it u BR a 1 1 1 1 + + = γ β    1...12    t , 9 ... 1 = = ∀i  
where   = it 1 β the vector of beta coefficients for each bank  9 ... 1 = i ,  t = 1993…2004  
{} ns combinatio S L E M A C SCORE BR it it it it it it it it , , , , , , , 1 =  
        = it SCORE1 the total score  of CAMELS system (SCORE1) 
         = it C the score of the component "Capital"  
         = it A  the score of the component "Asset Quality"    24
         = it M  the score of the component "Management Effectiveness "  
         = it E  the score of the component "Earnings"  
         = it L  the score of the component "Liquidity"  
         = it S  the score of the component "Sensitivity to market risk"  
In the above system of equations we apply the fixed effects model. The constant 
term  i a1 reflects all omitted variables with the additional assumptions that these 
variables are constant overtime but differ among banks
14. Consequently the vector 
[] 19 12 11 1 ,..., , a a a a i = ′ should be estimated. It should also be mentioned that the vector 
1 γ  is constant for all the banks and its sign and statistical significance will indicate the 
validity of the hypothesis. In Table 2 (see Appendix 3) we present the results for two 
equations, one with the total score (SCORE1) and a second with all individual 
components. 
The coefficient of total score (SCORE1) is positive, as predicted by the model, 
and   statistically significant. This is an indication that the market can effectively 
monitor and analyse the bank risk. In order to evaluate the significance of the 
individual components of the CAMELS system, we run several regressions with each 
of the component or combinations of the components. The capital component (C) and 
the earnings component (E) turn out, in all cases, to be positive and statistically 
significant. These two components, either individually or in combination, provide the 
best estimated equations (not presented here), which further strengthen our argument 
for the ability to monitor. Regarding the other components, the strongest results are 
exhibited by the management component (M). However, in all cases it is negative, 
opposite to that predicted by the model. 
4.5 Hypothesis about the ability to influence  
From the theoretical model and the comparative statics analysis the relation 
between actual risk assessment and transparency is negative, implying that the market 
is not able to impose discipline, at least in the form of transparency. In order to test its 
                                                           
14Alternative we have estimated a time fixed effects model to capture time variability but the results 
were not significant and the model were not adopted.    25
validity we rely on the conclusion of section 4.4 where the ability to monitor has been 
empirically estimated. As a consequence beta and SCORE1 can be used 
interchangeably and we run the following panel data regression: 
it it it u BTI 1 1 1 1 + + = β δ α    1...12    t , 9 ... 1 = = ∀i  
where   = it 1 β the vector of beta coefficients for each bank  9 ... 1 = i ,  t = 1993…2004  
          = it BTI  transparency index 
The results are presented in the Table 3 (see Appendix 3). 
 The coefficient is positive and statistically significant implying that the market 
can force riskier banks to become more transparent. This conclusion is contrary to the 
results of theoretical model which predicted that riskier banks would be less 
transparent (more noise in their disclosure policy). This may be attributed to a 
possible mismatch between the concept of transparency used in the model and the one 
used in the empirical estimations. The theoretical model focuses on transparency, 
defined as the disclosed percentage of investment initiatives that are expected be 
successful, whereas the empirical specification may be broader and captures issues of 
corporate governance other than transparency. 
 
5. Conclusions   
The information gap between the banks and the market participants is widely 
acknowledged in the international banking bibliography. The sophistication of the 
market increases over time and thus the demand for new information on various 
aspects of bank activity. The banks cannot ignore the need for transparency but, being 
afraid of information property rights and of free riding by competitors, they are 
unwilling to satisfy completely the disclosure requirements of the market. We can 
usefully model this issue as a game between the banks and the market. We take 
advantage of this signaling game in order to develop a theoretical model of 
transparency. The model is used to develop two hypotheses about market discipline, 
that is, the ability to monitor the bank riskiness and the ability to influence the bank 
management actions. Then these hypotheses are empirically tested on Greek banking 
sector data. The results are somehow contradictory. The theoretical model predicts 
that market participants have the ability to monitor bank riskiness but they lack the   26
ability to affect bank management actions in the form of transparency. The empirical 
application confirms the ability to monitor. However, contrary to the model 
prediction, it also confirms the ability to influence bank decisions. 
To our knowledge, this is the first attempt to model the components of market 
discipline. The theoretical results of the model are not fully confirmed. Further work 
can be twofold. On the theoretical approach, a specification that captures more aspects 
of market participants’ ability to influence as well as a multi-period model that 
incorporates the bank’s opportunity to build a truth-telling reputation, may enhance 
the outcome of the model. One empirical approach, the application in more mature 
markets than the Greek banking sector, may provide better results. This may improve 
significantly the data sample but it has a drawback. This is the need for non-disclosed 
data, which may better capture bank risk, in order to calculate the transparency index.   27
References 
Baumann U. and Nier E. (2004) “Disclosure, Volatility and Transparency: The 
Empirical Investigation into the Value of Bank Disclosure”, FRBNY Economic Policy, 
31-45. 
 
Berger N.A., Davies M.S., and Flannery J.M. (2000) “Comparing Market and 
Supervisory Assessments of Bank Performance: Who Knows What When?”, Journal 
of Money, Credit and Banking, 32 (3), 641-670. 
 
B.I.S (2003) “Markets for Bank Subordinated Debt and Equity in Basel Committee 
Member Countries”, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision Working paper No.12. 
 
Bliss R.R. (2004) “Market Discipline: Players, Processes and Purposes”, in C. Borio 
et al (eds.), Market Discipline across Countries and Industries, The MIT Press. 
 
Bliss R.R. and Flannery J. M. (2002) “Market Discipline in Governance of U.S. Bank 
Holding Companies: Monitoring vs. Influencing”, European Finance Review, 6 (3), 
361-395. 
 
Blum J.M. (2002) “Subordinated Debt, Market Discipline, and Banks' Risk Taking”, 
Journal of Banking and Finance, 26 (7) 1427-1441.  
 
Bongini P., Laeven L. and Majnoni G. (2002) “How Good is the Market at Assessing 
Bank Fragility? A Horse Race between Different Indicators”, Journal of Banking and 
Finance, 26, 1011-1028. 
 
Boot A. and Schmeits A. (2000) “Market Discipline and Incentive Problems in 
Conglomerate Firms with Application to Banking”, Journal of Financial 
Intermediation, 9, 240-273. 
 
Boot A. and Thakor A. (2001) “The Many Faces of Information Disclosure”, Review 
of Financial Studies, 14 (4), 1021-1057. 
 
Caprio G. and Honohan P. (2004) “Can the Unsophisticated Market Provide 
Discipline?”, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 3364. 
 
Cordella T.  and Yeyati E.L. (1998) “Public Disclosure and Bank Failures”, IMF Staff 
Papers, 45 (1), 110-131. 
 
Crawford V. and Sobel J. (1982) “Strategic Information Transmission”, 
Econometrica, 50 (6), 1431-1451. 
 
De Ceuster M.J.K. and Masschelein N. (2003) “Regulating Banks through Market 
Discipline: A Survey of the Issues”, Journal of Economic Surveys, 17 (5), 749-766.  
 
DeYoung R., Flannery J.M., Lang W. W. and Sorescu M.S. (2001) “The 
Informational Advantage of Specialized Monitors: The Case of Bank Examiners”, 
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 33 (4), 900-925. 
   28
Gibbon R. (1992), A Primer in Game Theory, Harvester, Wheatsheaf. 
 
Gropp R., Vesala J. and Vulpes G. (2002) “Equity and Debt Market Signals as 
Leading Indicators of Bank Fragility”, ECB Working Paper Series No 150. 
 
Healey P. and Palepu K. (2001) “Information Asymmetry, Corporate Disclosure, and 
the Capital Markets: A Review of the Empirical Disclosure Literature”, Journal of 
Accounting and Economics, 31 (1-3), 405-440. 
 
Herring R.J. (2004) “The Subordinated Debt Alternative to Basel II”, Journal of 
Financial Stability, 1, 137-155. 
 
Hyytinen A. and Takalo T. (2002) “Enhancing Bank Transparency: A Re-
assessment”, European Finance Review, 6, 429-445.  
 
Hyytinen A. and Takalo T. (2004) “Preventing Systemic Crises through Bank 
Transparency”, Economic Notes, 33 (2), 257-273. 
 
Jordan J.S., Peek J. and Rosengren E.S. (2000) “The Market Reaction to the 
Disclosure of Supervisory Action: Implication for Bank Transparency”, Journal of 
Financial Intermediation, 9, 298-319. 
 
Jorion P. (2002) “How Informative are Value-at-Risk Disclosures”, The Accounting 
Review, 77 (4), 911-931.  
 
Kwan S. (2004) “Testing the Strong-Form of Market Discipline: The Effects of Public 
Market Signals on Bank Risk”, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Working 
Paper No. 2004-19. 
 
Llewellyn D. (2005) “Inside the ‘Black Box’ of Market Discipline”, Institute of 
Economic Affaires, 41-47.  
 
Matutes C. and Vives X. (2000) “Imperfect Competition, Risk Taking, and 
Regulation in Banking”, European Economic Review, 44, 1-34. 
 
Morgan P. D. (2002) “Rating Banks: Risk and Uncertainty in an Opaque Industry”, 
American Economic Review, 92, (4), 874-888. 
 
Morgan P.D. and Stiroh K.J.  (2001) “Market Discipline of Banks: The Asset Test”, 
Journal of Financial Services Research, 20 (2-3), 195-208. 
 
Nier E. and Baumann U. (2003) “Market Discipline, Disclosure and Moral Hazard in 
Banking” EFA 2003 Annual Conference Paper No. 664. 
 
Rochet J.C. (2004) “Market Discipline in Banking”, in C. Borio et al (eds.), Market 
Discipline across Countries and Industries, The MIT Press. 
 
Shin H.S. (2003) “Disclosures and Asset Returns”, Econometrica, 71 (1), 105-133. 
 
   29
Sironi A. (2003) “Testing for Market Discipline in the European Banking Industry: 
Evidence from Subordinated Debt Issues”, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 35, 
443-472. 
 
Verrecchia R. (2001) “Essays on Disclosure”, Journal of Accounting and Economics, 
32, 97-180. 
 
Wilson W., Rose L. and Pinfold J.F. (2004) “Market Discipline in New Zealand: Can 
Retail Depositors Exercise it?”, Massey University Department of Commerce 




C  Capital adequacy ratio  
A  Risk-weighted Assets /Total Assets    
  Non-performing loans/Total loans   
  Overdue loans /Total loans   
  Provisions/Non-performing loans  
  Supervisory provisions /Total loans   
M  Operational Expenses/Total Assets  
  Operational Expenses/Gross Profits  
  Personnel Expenses/Total Assets  
  Personnel Expenses/Gross Profits 
  Interest rate spread   
  Average cost per employee    
  Average profit per employee  
  Gross Profit per branch   
E ROA   
 ROE   
  Interest income /Total Assets  
  Other Income /Total Assets  
  Gross Profits/Total Assets  
L  Liquidity index  
S  Net outcome of 1% change on interest rates/ Regulatory capital   
  Regulatory capital for FX risk/ Regulatory capital   




C  Own Funds/Total Assets  
A Provisions/Total  loans   
M  Operational Expenses/Total Assets  
  Operational Expenses/Gross Profits  
  Personnel Expenses/Total Assets  
  Personnel Expenses/Gross Profits 
E ROA   
 ROE   
  Interest income /Total Assets  
  Other Income /Total Assets  
  Gross Profits/Total Assets  
L  Liquid assets/Total Assets  
  Liquid assets/Deposits  
 Loans/Deposits   




Table 1. Simple regressions: risk assessment comparison 
Dependent variable SCORE2 
Bank 
Variables 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8  9 








































2  0.00 0.98 0.02 0.06 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.02  0.03 
DW  0.17 2.90 0.46 0.70 0.59 0.79 0.21 0.80  0.34 
Notes: 1. Due to confidentiality of data the actual names of the banks are not disclosed 
             2. We have estimated the equation 
            ( ) ( )     1 1 1 2 i i i u SCORE a SCORE + + = γ   
                with OLS for each bank  9 ... 1 = ∀i . 
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Table 2. Regression between bank risk assessment according to the 
market (β1 ) and actual risk assessment as measured by CAMELS System 
Variables   Equation 1  Equation 2 
SCORE 1  1.15 (0.50)  - 
C  - 4.36  (1.36) 
A  - -0.96  (1.19) 
M  - -5.40  (1.34) 
E  - 6.23  (2.43) 
L  - -0.23  (0.10) 
S  - -1.96  (2.63) 
Fixed effects     
1  0.62 (0.18)  -3.60 (2.51) 
2  0.20 (0.20)  -3.82 (2.49) 
3  0.68 (0.18)  -3.42 (2.50) 
4  0.18 (0.24)  -4.08 (2.50) 
5  0.74 (0.18)  -3.37 (2.51) 
6  0.71 (0.19)  -3.33 (2.52) 
7  0.09 (0.22)  -4.08 (2.50) 
8  0.63 (0.18)  -3.53 (2.50) 
9  0.53 (0.18)  -3.70 (2.49) 
R
2 0.35  0.52 
Notes: 1. We have estimated the equations   
           it it i it u SCORE a 1 1 1 1 1 + + = γ β   (Equation 1) 
           it it it it it it it i it u S L E M A C a 1 6 5 4 3 2 1 1 1 + + + + + + + = γ γ γ γ γ γ β (Equation 2) 
with SUR method and Weighted Least Squares respectively,  for each  
 bank  1...12    t , 9 ... 1 = = ∀i .  
               2. The standard errors are shown in the parentheses.  
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Table 3. Regression of transparency index (BTI)  on market 
assessment of bank riskiness  
Variables  Estimated coefficients 
β1  0.006 (0.002) 
Fixed effects   
1 0.0085  (0.003) 
2 0.024  (0.002) 
3 0.014  (0.003) 
4 0.025  (0.003) 
5 0.016  (0.003) 
6 0.014  (0.003) 
7 0.020  (0.002) 
8 0.015  (0.003) 
9 0.013  (0.003) 
R
2 0.25 
Notes: 1. We have estimated the equation  
             it it it u BTI 1 1 1 1 + + = β δ α    
 with Least Squares, for each bank  1...12    t , 9 ... 1 = = ∀i    
2. The standard errors are shown in the parentheses.    35
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